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ARTICLES
EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND WRONGS:
DEFENDING FLORIDA PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS
IN EXPULSION PROCEEDINGS
ROBERT HORNSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is about the representation of children facing expulsion
from public schools and how to protect their due process rights.
While the article focuses principally upon the representation of chil-
dren in Florida's public schools, the personal narrative and legal anal-
ysis, as well as the state and federal decisional authority relied upon, is
intended to have an application beyond the parochial confines of Flor-
ida law. Part II of the article1 begins with a look at how federal and
state courts across the country have treated and defined the due pro-
cess rights of public school students facing expulsion. The article next
examines what protections Florida law, both statutory and decisional,
provides a student under expulsion from a public school. In Part IV, I
share what I have learned defending public school expulsions based
on my own experiences in two Florida cases, and in Part V the article
concludes by briefly addressing the critical importance and constitu-
tional significance of a student's right to counsel when facing expul-
sion from a public school.
This article has been in the making for a good number of years. I
first represented students facing expulsion from public schools in 1988
in Jackson, Mississippi, and continued as a Legal Services lawyer in
rural Delaware. In the early 1990's, I was practicing poverty law in
* Robert Hornstein is an attorney from Gainesville, Florida. He is a 1984 graduate of the
University of Arkansas School of Law at Fayetteville. From 1987 until 1996 he practiced poverty
law with legal services programs in Mississippi, Delaware and Florida. A special note of ac-
knowledgement is due Corrine Messick for her tireless assistance in the preparation of this arti-
cle. Her contributions were many and invaluable.
1. This article is limited to an examination of the expulsion of regular education students
and does not cover or address the expulsion rights of disabled students under the Individuals
With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (IDEA). See, e.g., Terry Jean Selig-
mann, Not As Simple As ABC: Disciplining Children With Disabilities Under The 1997 IDEA
Amendments, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 77 (2000); Theresa J. Bryant, The Death Knell For School Expul-
sion: The 1997 Amendments To The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 47 AM. U.L.
REV. 487 (1998).
1
Hornstein: Educational Rights and Wrongs: Defending Florida Public Schools S
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2004
2 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
the southern-most part of Delaware, Sussex County, which lies just
over the Maryland border. The county is part of the Delmarva Penin-
sula, a narrow strip of land running south from Delaware into coastal
Virginia, bordered by the Atlantic on the east and covered with water-
ways and estuaries of all sizes and shapes that extend west to the
Chesapeake Bay. By and large, Sussex County is very rural, and, in
many instances, very poor, except for the beach communities that line
Delaware's Gold Coast, which serve as a summer destination for
many of Washington D.C.'s political elite.
On the far western side of Sussex County lies Highway 13, which
runs south from Dover, the state capital, to Salisbury, Maryland. The
western part of Sussex County is defined by large expanses of flat and
fertile agricultural land that carry one's eyes to the horizon. As High-
way 13 snakes its way south, it is framed on both sides by a menagerie
of motels, local restaurants, and an assortment of other businesses
that one might expect to find on a rural state highway. The Wood-
bridge School District sits a short distance from Highway 13 in the
small town of Bridgeville, Delaware. It was at a Woodbridge School
Board expulsion hearing2 held the same night that the first Gulf War
began, January 16, 1991,' that I first experienced what I would de-
scribe as an unwritten, though clearly apparent, presumption of cor-
rectness that clothes a school principal's decision to expel a student.
This presumption of correctness took on the cast of an institutional
orthodoxy strictly adhered to by most, though not all, of the teachers,
school district administrators, and school board members.4 The 14-
year-old middle school student I was defending that evening was ex-
pelled by the Woodbridge School Board, but several weeks later the
Delaware State Board of Education overturned the local school
board's expulsion order and reinstated the student. 5
An important factor in the Delaware State Board of Education's
decision to reverse the Woodbridge School Board's order of expulsion
was the "automatic" nature of the student's expulsion as well as a
finding that the local school board took personal offense at the stu-
2. In Re William Dickerson, Decision and Order, (Del. State Bd. of Educ. March 21,
1991).
3. Id. at 2.
4. In Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1974), Judge John
Godbold, writing for a three member panel of the Fifth Circuit, pointed out:
Formalistic acceptance or ratification of the principal's request or recommendation as to the
scope of punishment without independent Board consideration of what, under all the cir-
cumstances, the penalty should be, is less than full due process. Appropriate punishment is
for the Board to determine, in the exercise of its independent judgment.
5. It should be noted that Judge Godbold was a member of the Fifth Circuit during the
period when that court was deciding a wide array of ground breaking civil rights and constitu-
tional issues. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (Simon And Schuster 1981).
In re William Dickerson.
[Vol. 27:1
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dent's effort to defend himself at the expulsion hearing.6 Specifically,
the Delaware State Board of Education pointed to a Woodbridge
School Board member's statement that he was "offended" by the in-
troduction of evidence that showed one of the student's teachers had
made a notation in the child's records that the student "had been set
up to fail."7 The board member considered this evidence a "slight on
the board" and on the school district.8
In 1992, I left Delaware to do housing litigation for a legal services
program in Miami, Florida. After several years in South Florida, I
again had the opportunity to represent school children facing expul-
sion, though this time it would be in Central Florida. In the fall of
1996, I took on the representation of an exceptional education student
who had been placed under expulsion. 9 I found the student's school
district to be resistant, if not openly hostile, to the student's exercise
of basic due process rights. Because the student was protected by the
provisions of the IDEA,1 ° however, the Osceola County School Board
was required to secure a judicial injunction excluding the student from
the school district." The open hostility of the student's school district
is reflected in some of the remarks made by its counsel at the emer-
gency judicial hearing before a circuit court judge:
Isn't it wonderful? Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
which is the statute that [the student's counsel] loves... there is now a
category for socially maladjusted.
I mean are we to be faulted that "we've come here today before some-
one has been hurt? Is what [the] student's counsel would suggest that
we need to wait [until] there's blood?
We can't run a school if we're forced to put [the student] back. I think
the worst thing that ... can happen to [the trial court] [is] you can get
reversed and I'll go down fighting to make sure . . ." [P]erhaps [the
student's counsel] would like to live in the world where the inmates
run the prison.1 2
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. Sch. Bd. of Osceola County, Fla. v. Student W.R., No. CI96-1427 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct.
1996).
10. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491.
11. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
12. Transcript at 80, 174-177, Sch. Bd. Of Osceola County Fla.,(No. C196-1427). The trial
court refused to grant the Osceola County School Board an injunction. Because the suit was
filed under the IDEA, the student was entitled to recover fees as the prevailing party. See 20
U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(B) (1999). The Osceola County School District, however, took the curious
position that the same court from which it sought an injunction nevertheless lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to award fees under the IDEA. The trial court agreed and denied the claim for
2004]
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Whether the venue was Mississippi, rural Delaware, or Central
Florida, my clients were without exception poor, and frequently,
though not always, minority children.' 3 In Florida each year nearly
one thousand middle and high school students across the state are ex-
pelled from the public schools.' 4 Thousands more Florida students
face short-term suspensions from the schoolhouse. 5 The conse-
quences of expulsion, however, are severe. Students who are expelled
can be barred from attending a public school for nearly two years
under Florida law.16
Given the singular importance contemporary society attaches to ed-
ucation, and considering that a free and equal public education contin-
ues to be one of the defining features of American democracy, 17 it is
hard to understand why such a vital and elemental component of de-
mocracy can be taken away, and, in some instances, abridged, with
such relative ease. No doubt, this contention would be sharply dis-
puted by school administrators and by the lawyers and law firms that
represent them. It is no less discomforting that a student's exercise of
his due process rights can engender the type of hostility and vitupera-
tive reaction revealed in the excerpted comments by that one Florida
school district's legal counsel.'"
fees on jurisdictional grounds but was eventually reversed on appeal. W.R. ex rel. Doe v. Sch.
Bd. Of Osceola County, 726 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
13. Research over the last twenty-five years has shown that minority children are dispropor-
tionately disciplined. For instance, national statistics show that in 1998-1999, while African
American students constituted 17 percent of all students they nevertheless accounted for 31
percent of all students expelled. Research Brief (Bay Area School Reform Collaborative) Jan.
2001, at 1; See RUSSELL J. SKIDA & GIL G. NOAM, ZERO TOLERANCE: CAN SUSPENSION AND
EXPULSION KEEP SCHOOLS SAFE 74 (Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Co. Winer 2001); See also Opportuni-
ties Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School Discipline Policies,
Harvard Civil Rights Project & The Advancement Project (June 2000), at http://www.civilrights
project.harvard.edu/research/discipline/opport-suspended.php.
14. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND AR-
TICULATION, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND SCHOOL SUPPORT DISCIPLINARY DATA, 2001-2002. This
figure, however, does not include the thousands of students who are placed under expulsion but
before the conclusion of the expulsion process are placed in an alternative school. These "alter-
native placements," however, are not included in the expulsion statistics by either local school
districts or the Florida Department of Education. See FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
INFORMATION DATA BASE REQUIREMENTS, VOL. I, AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEM AUTo-
MATED STUDENT DATA ELEMENTS. If these alternative placements were included, the number
of Florida students under expulsion would increase to 5960.
15. ACHIEVEMENT AND ARTICULATION, Supra at note 14. For the reporting period of 2000-
2001, there were over 170,000 suspensions in Florida's public schools.
16. Fla. Stat. ch. 1003.01(6) (2004), permits a school to expel a student for a period of time
not to exceed the remainder of the term or school year and one additional year of attendance.
17. In Brown v. Bd. of Educ. ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) the United States Supreme Court
pointed out that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments." Further, the Supreme Court noted that "compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of educa-
tion to our democratic society."
18. See supra note 13.
[Vol. 27:1
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In this connection, both state and federal courts have displayed a
reticence to second-guess the decisions of school administrators to ex-
pel students.19 Importantly, however, this judicial reticence is quali-
fied by the obligation of courts to examine the actions of a school
board for constitutional and state law compliance.2° Notwithstanding
the willingness of courts to make such inquiries, federal and state
courts have shown little enthusiasm to intervene in school discipline
cases.
21
II. THE LONG-SHADOW OF Goss v. LoPEz: WHAT PROCESS
REMAINS DUE PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS THREE
DECADES LATER
Almost three decades ago, the United States Supreme Court held
that a student facing suspension or expulsion is deserving of due pro-
cess.2 2 In Goss, the Supreme Court established a general due process
framework for public school disciplinary actions, but did not mandate
the particular requirements of due process. 23 Goss, however, clearly
held that a student's entitlement to a public education is a property
interest that cannot be denied without due process.24 The Supreme
Court also made clear that school discipline implicates a student's
"liberty interest in [his] reputation. While the Supreme Court in
Goss did not mandate a uniform set of protections applicable to all
public school disciplinary proceedings, the court explained:
19. See Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 149 F. Supp. 2d 665, 675 (E.D. Wisc. 2001)
(noting it is not the role of federal courts to set aside decisions of school officials which may be
unwise or lack compassion); See also Parent v. Osceola Sch., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1248-51 (M.D.
Fla. 1999) (in context of an IDEA suit, which involved a claim of an unlawful expulsion under
state and federal law, the court noted that district courts should not substitute their own notions
of sound educational policy for those of school authorities).
20. In Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 579 (6th Cir. 2000), a zero tolerance expulsion case, the
Sixth Circuit pointed out: "As a matter of federal constitutional law.., the Board may not expel
students from school arbitrarily or irrationally. . The fact that we must defer to the Board's
rational decisions in school discipline cases does not mean that we must, or should, rationalize
away its irrational decisions."
See also C.J. v. Sch. Bd., 438 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining strict standard of
review in cases involving zero tolerance policies); See also Jennifer Smith Richards, Official Dis-
cretion With Zero Tolerance Leaves Some Parents Wondering If The Policy Is Applied Evenly,
SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, March 7, 2004, at A-1.
21. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (indicating that it is not the role of the
federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking
in wisdom or compassion); See also Remer, 149 F.Supp. at 675, (all the court may do is deter-
mine whether a school district expelling a student comported with the requirements of the
constitution).
22. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
23. Id. at 584.
24. Goss involved suspensions of short duration that did not exceed 10 days.
25. Id. at 576.
5
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It also appears that the timing and content of the notice and the na-
ture of the hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of the
competing interests involved.
Disciplinarians, although proceeding in good faith, frequently act on
the reports and advice of others; and the controlling facts and the na-
ture of the conduct under challenge are often disputed. The risk of
error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded against if that may
be done without prohibitive cost ... 26
In Goss, the Supreme Court "stopp[ed] short of construing the due
process clause to require, countrywide, that hearings in connection
with short suspensions must afford the student the opportunity to se-
cure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the
charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the inci-
dent. ' '27 However, the Supreme Court recognized ". . . expulsions for
the remainder of the school term . . . may require more formal
procedures. 2 8
Since Goss, courts have labored to give definition to Goss's due
process analysis as applied to a public school expulsion proceeding.29
While courts have uniformly recognized that "due process is a flexible
concept determined by the nature of the interest affected and the con-
text in which the alleged deprivation occurs,". . . [t]he immutable min-
imum requisites of due process, however, are notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.3" Frequently, courts employ the Matthews v.
Eldridge balancing test to determine what process is due a student
facing expulsion. 3' Due process for a public school student under ex-
pulsion has been held to include an impartial hearing with an opportu-
nity to offer evidence and cross-examine witnesses.32 The failure to
afford a student the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses has been
26. Id. at 580.
27. Id. at 583.
28. Id. at 584.
29. For instance, in Newsome v. Batavia Local School Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 924-26 (6th Cir.
1988), the court held that the school board's decision not to allow the student an opportunity to
cross-examine student accusers, the principal, or the district superintendent, did not violate the
student's due process rights. However, in the same case the Sixth Circuit did find that the super-
intendent's disclosure to the school board in closed deliberations of new evidence that had not
been presented during the expulsion hearing was violative of due process. Id. at 927.
30. Colquitt v. Rich TP High School, 699 N.E. 2d 1109, 1115 (Ill. App. 1995); See also Carey
on behalf of Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. #17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 919 (D. Me. 1990)
(enumerating seven minimum requirements that must be observed to satisfy due process in
school expulsion hearings).
31. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); See, e.g., B.S. v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 255 F. Supp.
2d 891, 898-99 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (court used Matthews test to find no due process violations); See
also Hammock ex. rel. Hammock v. Keys, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1228 n.8 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (in
school expulsion case, district court pointed out courts often use the Matthews test in school
discipline cases).
32. Rucker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 512 A.2d 703, 705 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
[Vol. 27:1
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the basis in a number of cases for setting aside an expulsion.33 How-
ever, a fair number of courts have held a student's right to due process
does not necessarily or always include an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine accusers or school officials. 3n Nevertheless, some courts have
held the ability to compel the attendance of witnesses can be a re-
quired element of due process in a school expulsion hearing.35 A stu-
dent's inability to compel the attendance of witnesses has been
interpreted as creating an unfair disparity between the student's and
school board's abilities to present evidence.36
Courts are uniform in holding that due process requires an impar-
tial decision-maker. 37 Further, the failure to provide a student infor-
mation about the identity of his accuser or the nature of the specific
charge has been held violative of due process.38 Additionally, a school
board cannot use evidence to support an expulsion that was not dis-
closed to the student.39 Moreover, a school board is obligated to com-
ply with rules it promulgates that concern student expulsion rights.4n
The increasing use of alternative school placements has been the
subject of appellate review. A number of courts have held that a
school administrator's decision to transfer a student to an alternative
school does not trigger substantive due process concerns because the
"transfer [is an] executive act and the right infringed is not a funda-
mental right."41 In Marner ex rel. Marner v. Eufaula City Sch. Bd., the
33. Stone v. Prosser Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 116, 971 P.2d 125, 128 (Wash. App. 1999) (re-
versing expulsion on due process grounds because the student was unable to cross-examine wit-
nesses); See also In Re Expulsion of E.J.W., 632 NW. 2d 775, 778-783 (Minn. App. 2001).
34. B.S., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 898-99. B.S. was an expulsion case involving charges of sexual
misconduct. The student under expulsion was denied the opportunity to cross-examine his ac-
cusers. However, the court, using the Matthews test, found due process did not require cross-
examination. Id. at 899. See also Caston v. Benton Public Sch., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1129
(W.D. Ark. April 11, 2002) (failure to allow cross-examination of student witnesses did not vio-
late due process).
35. Nicholas ex rel. Nichols v. DeStefano, 70 P.3d 505, 508 (Colo. App. 2002) (failure of
school board to allow student to compel attendance of witnesses was factor in court's decision
that hearing did not comport with due process).
36. Id.
37. See Hammock, 93 F. Supp. 2d at, 1229 n.10 (noting that due process requires impartial
decision-maker, however, opining that a school administrator involved in the initiation of
charges is not thereby disqualified from conducting a hearing on the charges).
38. Camlin v. Beecher Cnty. Sch. Dist., 791 N.E. 2d 127, 131 (I11. App. 2003).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Marner ex rel. Marner v. Eufaula City Sch. Bd., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (M.D. Ala.
2002); See also C.B. by & Through Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 387-89 (11th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting substantive due process claim based on transfer to an alternative school and noting in
dicta that a procedural due process claim would not succeed because it was doubtful the student
had a property interest in attending a particular public school); cf. Nevares v. San Marcos Con-
sol. Indep. Sch., 111 F.3d 25, 26-27 (5th Cir. 1997) (indicating constitutional interests are not
implicated by transfer to alternative program but noting student must be treated fairly and given
an opportunity to explain why transfer is not justified).
20041
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district court reasoned that a fundamental right was not implicated
because "the right to attend public school is not a right implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty., 4 2  However, the Sixth Circuit in
Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, refused to foreclose a procedural due
process claim when a student is transferred to an alternative educa-
tional setting.43 In McCall v. Bossier Parish School Bd., the Louisiana
Court of Appeals concluded that transfer to an alternative school is
not an expulsion in the traditional sense, but also explained that:
Nevertheless, despite the diminishment of a protected property inter-
est, the Goss ruling also recognized that due process forbids arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. The punishment imposed which may harm a
student's good name and reputation may not be imposed without min-
imal requirements of due process being satisfied.44
The court in Buchanan explained further:
[A student] may not have procedural due process rights to notice and
an opportunity to be heard when the sanction imposed is attendance
at an alternative school absent some showing that the education re-
ceived at the alternative school is significantly different or inferior to
that received at his regular public school.45 (emphasis added)
The importance of not treating an alternative placement as an expul-
sion is made clear by the annual Florida Department of Education
discipline statistics.46 This definition obviously diminishes the protec-
tions these students enjoy and artificially masks and deflates the num-
bers of students reported as having been expelled.
III. DISCIPLINE AND DUE PROCESS IN FLORIDA'S SCHOOLHOUSES
Over the last three decades, Florida's appellate courts have ex-
amined a number of school expulsion issues - - including the rights
students facing expulsion enjoy under federal law. 47 Notably, Flor-
ida's school expulsion due process jurisprudence reflects the defining
element of the Goss paradigm: flexibility. In Student Alpha I.D. Num-
ber Guja v. School Board of Volusia County,48 a school suspension
42. Marner, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1323; See also Stafford Mun. Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 64 S.W. 3d
559, 563-64 (Tex. App. 2001) (transfer of student to alternative program does not impact a pro-
tected property or liberty interest implicating due process concerns).
43. 99 F.3d 1352, 1359 (6th Cir. 1996).
44. 785 So.2d 57, 66 (La. App. 2001).
45. Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1359. See also Marner, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 (holding absence of
extracurricular activities at alternative school does not implicate due process concerns). In a
report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Race and The Public Education System
in Mississippi, it was pointed out that "the quality of education that students receive at these
alternative schools leaves much to be desired." See http://www.usccr.gov.
46. See supra note 14.
47. See, e.g., Student Alpha I.D. Number Guja v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, 616 So.2d
1011, 1012-1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
48. Id. at 1011.
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case arising from a student's possession of marijuana, the court made
clear that "any analysis of procedural due process in a school suspen-
sion or expulsion case must begin with Goss..., In Student Alpha,
the court explained that due process in school disciplinary proceedings
was not a fixed or static legal concept: "The . . . interpretation and
application of due process are intensely practical matters, which ne-
gate any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation.
50
Florida's appellate courts have held that a school cannot expel a
student for conduct that did not occur on school grounds.5 1 Further,
the adoption of zero tolerance policies by school boards "does not
override the need for proof of a necessary element of the charged
violation . .5.2 When school boards adopt student rules prohibiting
conduct that would constitute a crime under Florida law, the school
board "is prohibited from promulgating rules at variance with legisla-
tion."53 In W.E.R. v. School Bd.,54 two students were expelled for vio-
lating a school board rule prohibiting the battering of a school
employee. The expulsion hearing officer, however, determined the
students were unaware that the employee was a school official.55
Based on this finding, the expulsion hearing officer recommended that
the students be found guilty of a less severe offense that did not cover
battery of an employee.56 The school board, however, concluded that
"knowledge of the employment status of the victim was immaterial
... 11" The appellate court found the school board rule at variance
with Fla. Stat. ch. 230.23015 and 784.081 because the statutes required
a showing that the student knew or should have known of the official
position of the victim." '58 Additionally, under Florida law, an expul-
sion cannot be supported solely on hearsay.59
Under a mandatory expulsion policy, now known as a zero-toler-
ance policy,6 ° Florida's courts have observed: "Because of our sensi-
49. Id. at 1017.
50. Id.
51. See M.T. v. Sch. Bd., 779 So.2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (held expulsion reversed
because the incident which prompted the school board's action did not occur at an event or on
property subject to the school board's authority).
52. Crawley v. School Bd., 721 So.2d 396, 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
53. W.E.R. v. School Bd., 749 So.2d 540, 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
54. Id. at 541.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 542.
58. Id.
59. See Franklin v. Dist. Sch. Bd., 356 So.2d 931, 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
60. Fla. Stat. ch. 1006.13 (2003) requires school boards to adopt zero tolerance policies for
criminal acts, substance abuse, and violence against students. Increasingly, zero tolerance poli-
cies have come under sharp criticism. Professors Russell J. Skida and Gil G. Noam, in their
recent publication, Zero Tolerance: Can Suspension and Expulsion Keep Schools Safe, observed
2004]
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tivity and concern, we intend that school boards turn square corners,
dot all of their 'i's' and cross all of their 't's' if they intend to enforce
such a rigid mandatory rule."61
However, Florida's courts have not been particularly forgiving of
students who appear pro se and later seek to raise constitutional error
for the first time on appeal.62 In a recent appellate decision, Elvira
Anderson v. School Bd. of Seminole County,63 the court upheld the
expulsion of a student, who appeared pro se with her parent at the
expulsion hearing, nothwithstanding the fact that she only received
notice of the hearing the Friday afternoon before the following Mon-
day morning expulsion hearing.64 The appellate court held, without
qualification, that "pro se litigants ... should not be treated differ-
ently from litigants in similar situations who are represented by coun-
sel and are charged with knowledge of those rights. '6 5 Thus, Florida's
school expulsion jurisprudence cannot be easily categorized as either
liberal or conservative with respect to applying the protections availa-
ble to students under Florida or federal law.
Florida decisional law, however, is not the only source of rights that
public school students enjoy in Florida. The Florida legislature has
enacted a latticework of provisions that imbue and authorize school
boards,66 district superintendents,67 principals,68 teachers 69 as well as
bus drivers7° with the authority to remove students from the class-
room, school buses and to discipline students. However, the Florida
legislature has also codified a wide array of rights and obligations that
affect and in many ways expand the rights of students facing expulsion
that "zero tolerance as a school discipline philosophy developed in the political arena for political
purposes." See supra note 14. (emphasis added). Skida and Noam also point out that there is a
strong basis to claim that for "whatever its appeal, zero tolerance has failed to demonstrate
effectiveness in reducing school violence or improving discipline." Id. Compounding the lack of
efficacy is the racial unfairness of such policies. As to racial disparities in school discipline,
"[s]tudies of school suspension have consistently documented over representation of low-income
students ... [and] racial disproportionalily in the use of [discipline] has been a highly consistent
finding." Id. at 30-31. See also RICK AYERS ET. AL., ZERO TOLERANCE: RESISTING THE DRIVE
FOR PUNISHMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS 166-175 (2001).
61. C.J. v. School Bd., 438 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
62. See Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole County, 830 So.2d 952, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 953.
66. For instance, local school boards must adopt rules for the, "control... discipline ... and
expulsion of students." Fla. Stat. ch. 1003.02(1)(c) (2004).
67. District superintendents are obligated by statute to support the decisions of teachers,
principals and school bus drivers to discipline students. See Fla. Stat. ch. 1006.08(1) (2004).
68. See Fla. Stat. ch. 1006.09(1)(b) & (c) (2004).
69. See Fla. Stat. ch. 1003.32 (2004).
70. See Fla. Stat. ch. 1006.10 (2004).
10
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 [2004], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol27/iss1/3
EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND WRONGS
from Florida's public schools. Included in the Florida Educational
Code is a statutory definition of expulsion:
Expulsion means the removal of the right and obligation of a student
to attend a public school under conditions set by the district school
board, and for a period of time not to exceed the remainder of the
term or school year and one additional year of attendance. Expulsions
may be imposed with or without continuing services and shall be re-
ported accordingly. 7
While Florida's educational statutes leave no doubt that teachers as
well as school principals are authorized to discipline students, the leg-
islature has devoted considerably less statutory space to explicitly set-
ting out the precise nature of rights that Florida law affords public
school students facing expulsion. In fact, the Educational Code is si-
lent on the precise elements of an expulsion hearing.72 Consequently,
there is no mention of a student's right to counsel, the right to present
evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses, or to undertake formal discovery.
The Educational Code, however, does obligate a district superinten-
dent, at the time he makes a recommendation for expulsion to the
school board, to "give written notice to the student and the student's
parent of the recommendation" along with notice of the charges
against the student and notice to the student and the student's parents
"of the student's right to due process as prescribed by ... 120.569 and
120.57 (2)".7 To identify a student's expulsion hearing rights, though,
it is necessary to refer to Florida's Administrative Procedure Act74
because the Educational Code provides that "expulsion hearings shall
be governed by" Florida's administrative hearing procedures.75
Therefore, the Educational Code itself does not require a particular
type of adjudicatory hearing for school expulsions but instead requires
this determination to be made under Florida's Administrative Proce-
dure Act.76
Florida's Administrative Procedure Act provides for two types of
adjudicatory hearings, each with a different degree of procedural pro-
tections. A formal hearing under ch. 120.57(1) contemplates a greater
number of procedural safeguards designed to assist in deciding dis-
puted questions of fact. In contrast, an informal hearing under
71. Fla. Stat. ch. 1003.01(6)(2) (2004).
72. Fla. Stat. ch. 1006.07 (1)(a) (2004).
73. Fla. Stat. ch. 1006.08 (1) (2004).
74. Fla. Stat. ch. 120.51-81 (2004).
75. See Fla. Stat. ch. 1006.07(1)(a) (2004). The actual statutory language states that "expul-
sion hearings shall be governed by ch. 120.569 and 120.57(2).
76. Fla. Stat. ch. 1006.07 (1)(a) & 1006.08 (1): See also Fla. Atty. Gen. Op. 2001-5 (Feb. 2,
2001) (examining the statutory framework applicable to school expulsion proceedings).
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11
Hornstein: Educational Rights and Wrongs: Defending Florida Public Schools S
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2004
12 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1
§ 120.57(2) is essentially a meeting. 77 Fla. Stat. ch. 120.569 provides
that the provisions of Florida's Administrative Procedures Act apply
"in all proceedings in which the substantial interests of a party are to
be determined by an agency ... ,78 Further, ch. 120.569 also provides
that: "Unless waived by all parties, ch. 120.57(1) applies whenever the
proceeding involves a disputed issue of material fact. Unless other-
wise agreed, ch. 120.57(2) applies in all other cases." Florida law has
long recognized that formal administrative proceedings "must be con-
ducted in a quasi-judicial manner in which the basic requirements of
due process are accorded and preserved."79 These basic requirements
contemplate reasonable notice, a decision based on competent and
substantial evidence, sworn testimony, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses and the right to present argument.80 The enumera-
tion of hearing rights under ch. 120.569 includes the right to present
testimony under oath, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to en-
gage in formal discovery, to challenge the admission of evidence, to
conduct cross-examination, and to submit proposed findings of fact.
Additionally, ch. 120.569(2)(b) specifies parties are entitled to at least
14 days notice; however, under ch. 120.81(1)(h), the hearing officer or
superintendent can waive the 14 day notice requirement without the
consent of the student. For these reasons, Fla. Stat. ch. 120.569 is criti-
cal to determining what procedural rights a student has in defending
against expulsion.
Other sources for identifying student rights are student codes of
conduct promulgated by individual school districts. Student codes are
mandated by Florida's Educational Code,8 and each district must
adopt a student code of conduct for elementary schools and one for
middle and high schools.82 A school district's student code of conduct
must be based on rules adopted by the local school boards, and must
include discipline policies, the specific grounds for disciplinary action,
the procedures that apply to disciplinary action and an explanation of
the rights and responsibilities of students.83
77. See Autoworld of Am. Corp. v. Dep't of Highway Safety, 754 So.2d 76, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
78. In this connection, the statutory definition of an agency includes a local school district.
Fla. Stat. ch. 120.52(6). Under Fla. Stat. ch. 120.81, hearings involving disputed facts pursuant to
Fla. Stat. ch. 120.57(1)(a) can be conducted by the local school board rather than by an adminis-
trative law judge.
79. Deel Motors Inc. v. Dep't of Commerce, 252 So.2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1971).
80. Id.
81. Fla. Stat. ch. 1006.07 (2) (2004).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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A review of student codes from fourteen different school districts in
the preparation of this article revealed a great degree of variance in
the quality and quantity of information disclosed to students about the
protections Florida law affords them in defending against an expul-
sion.84 Some school districts, if not by an act of commission, then by
an act of omission, fail to include critical information about the pro-
tections Florida law provides to students facing expulsion." For ex-
ample, the Orange County School Board's Code of Student Conduct
contains a ten-step process for expulsion of students. However, the
page long description of the ten-step process does not state that the
student can request a hearing to put on evidence, call witnesses, or
exercise the rights granted under Florida's Administrative Procedure
Act.8
6
Indeed, Step 7 of the Orange County School Board's student code
procedures actually suggest the only hearing available to a student is
one to "determine the sufficiency of the procedures. '8 7 Step 10 states
that "the parent or guardian shall have the right to appear before the
school board, "88 however, the Orange County School Board's student
code fails to fully disclose or explain critical information regarding the
student's due process rights and can be interpreted as misleading if
not outright wrong. There is no way that a student or her parent can
learn what rights a student has to defend against an expulsion89 from
reading the Orange County School Board's Student Code of Conduct.
The Okeechobee School Board's Code of Student Conduct pro-
vides information on the nature of the rights available to a student
under expulsion, but also fails to mention all the rights available to
students under Florida law.9 ° For example the Okeechobee School
District student code of conduct informs the student that hearings are
conducted under ch.120.57(2), but makes no reference to Fla. Stat. ch.
120.57 (1) or ch.120.569, though it does list the right to present evi-
84. The fourteen student codes of conduct reviewed were from the following school dis-
tricts: 1) Pasco County Public Schools; 2) Hillsborough County Public School; 3) Putman County
Public Schools; 4) Marion County Public Schools; 5) Pinellas County Public Schools; 6) Miami-
Dade County Public Schools; 7) Orange County Public Schools; 8) Okeechobee County Public
Schools; 9) Escambia County Public Schools; 10) Bradford County Public Schools; 11) Liberty
County Public Schools; 12) Hendry County Public Schools; 13) Santa Rosa County Public
Schools; and 14) Indian River County Public Schools.
85. See e.g., INDIAN RIVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT (2003-2004).
Examples of other school districts that have student codes of conduct that fail to fully inform
students of the rights available to defend against a proposed expulsion include the Hendry
County Public Schools, the Liberty County Public Schools and the Bradford County Public
Schools.
86. ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 21-22 (2003-2004).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. OKEECHOBEE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT (2003).
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dence, to argue, to cross-examination, the right to present rebuttal evi-
dence and the right to have counsel.91 Further, the Okeechobee
School District Code of Student Conduct also provides that Florida's
Model Rules of Administrative Procedure will govern the hearing,92
and under the student code, the hearing officer must prepare findings
of fact, conclusions of law and a proposed final order.93 Following the
hearing officer's proposed action, the student is entitled to appear at
the school board meeting.94
Only one of the fourteen student codes reviewed informs students
of their right to have a formal hearing under Fla. Stat. ch. 120.57(1) 95
and none make reference to ch. 120.569. Nor does any of the student
codes reviewed inform students that they can compel the attendance
of witnesses or obtain documents and information from the school dis-
trict through discovery. Also, none of the student codes reviewed
mention or recognize the fourteen day notice provided in ch. 120.569
or explain that a student can ask for a continuance of the hearing to
obtain more time to prepare. In this regard, a number of the school
districts use a question and answer form that provides general infor-
mation on the rights available to a student under expulsion, but even
these districts do not provide a clear or full description of the range of
rights and protections available to students.96 While student codes of
conduct are a resource for identifying student rights, they cannot be
relied upon to provide either a complete or accurate statement of
rights available to students facing expulsion.
Because many students are unable to afford counsel, the omission
of a complete statement of rights in the student code can severely
prejudice a student's efforts to defend the expulsion. The fact that
additional information on a student's rights may be found in school
board rules or policies is of little assistance because these are rarely, if
ever, voluntarily or promptly given to students or their parents.97
91. Id. at 13.
92. Id. at 13-14; See F.A.C. Vol. 5-28-106-101 (rules applicable to administrative proceed-
ings in which the substantial interests of a party are to be adjudicated).
93. Supra note 90 at 14.
94. Id.
95. PUTNAM COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT 14 (2003-2004).
96. See, e.g., PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT (May 7,
2003).
97. This statement is based on my own experience in representing children in school expul-
sions and interviewing parents of children under expulsion.
14
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 [2004], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol27/iss1/3
EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND WRONGS
IV. NOTES ON DEFENDING PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS
FACING EXPULSION
A lawyer defending a student facing expulsion from Florida's public
schools should keep in mind that Florida law provides students a far
greater number of legal protections than does the Goss v. Lopez due
process paradigm. The hearing rights guaranteed by Fla. Ch. 120.569
and ch. 120.57(1) go beyond what a substantial number of federal and
state courts have been willing to hold due process requires under the
federal constitution.98 For example, under Fla. Stat. ch. 120.569, wit-
nesses can be compelled to appear and a student is entitled to conduct
formal discovery. Consequently, a lawyer defending a student in an
expulsion proceeding should not depend alone on due process under
the framework of Goss to safeguard the student's rights.
After establishing the student's right to invoke the protections
available under Fla. Stat. ch. 120.569 and ch. 120.57 (1), two threshold
tasks should be: (1) gathering information generated by the school
and (2) obtaining school district expulsion policies, procedures and
guidelines. School boards frequently have a written set of guidelines
that school administrators must follow in deciding whether to expel a
student and in carrying out an expulsion. 99 These written guidelines
may include specific forms and particular types of information. 10
Also, school administrators frequently ask the student's classroom
teachers to supply background information that is then used by the
school in deciding whether to proceed with an expulsion.1 'O Conse-
quently, teacher statements and records can prove critical to defend-
ing the student. Also, witness statements are gathered by school
officials and the facts relating to the incident are collected in several
different formats. All of this information should be obtained because
it can yield helpful facts to defend against the expulsion on the merits.
Obtaining this type of information is essential for another reason: to
overcome the effect of what I described earlier as a presumption of
correctness that clothes a school administrator's decision to expel a
student and the institutional orthodoxy that can taint the entire expul-
sion process. Just how completely this institutional orthodoxy can in-
fluence an expulsion proceeding is illustrated by a high school
expulsion case I handled several years ago, Central Florida, Paul J.
98. See, e.g., Caston v. Benton Pub. Sch., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1129 (W.D. Ark. April 11,
2002).
99. See SCHOOL BOARD OF SARASOTA COUNTY, DISTRICT DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, A
GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS § 5 (2002-2003).
100. See Id. § 8.
101. See Id.
2004]
15
Hornstein: Educational Rights and Wrongs: Defending Florida Public Schools S
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2004
16 - NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1
Hagerty, Superintendent v. S.S. 1 2 My client, S.S., was a 15-year-old
African-American high school student under expulsion from the Sem-
inole County Public Schools for allegedly threatening other students
on a school district bus with a weapon described as a knife or blade.1"3
By way of background, Seminole County, which is located in Cen-
tral Florida, is near Eatonville, the home of the gifted African-Ameri-
can writer and folklorist, Zora Neal Hurston. 10 4 Hurston was born in
1891 in Eatonville, which at that time was one of the only self-gov-
erning black communities in the nation.105 Historically, Seminole
County always had a sizeable African-American population,0 6 and, as
was the case across the South, Seminole County's communities and
schools were segregated both by law and by tradition. 0 7 Hurston,
who was acutely aware of the absurdity of America's racial conven-
tions, and who celebrated the richness of African-American culture,
also had a keen sense of social irony. It was her appreciation for so-
cial irony that is reported to have allowed her to avoid receiving a
traffic infraction for crossing a street when the light was red. When
approached by the police officer, Hurston explained to him that since
the whites had crossed with the green light, she just assumed the red
light was for African-Americans. According to the story, the police
officer declined to charge her with a traffic citation.' 08
Seminole County's African Americans provided a source of low-
wage labor for the area's farming operations. 10 9 Margaret Barnes, a
102. Paul J. Hagerty, Superintendent v. S.S., (Case No. 97-11, Sch. Bd. of Seminole County).
I represented S.S. and was aided by the counsel of two other public interest lawyers, Treena
Kaye and Peter Sleasman.
103. Seminole County Public Schools Secondary Discipline Referral (August 20, 1997); Sem-
inole County Public Schools Principal's Recommendation for Expulsion (August 20, 1997).
104. ZORA NEALE HURSTON, DUST TRACKS ON A ROAD 1-7 (Harper Perennial 1996). Hur-
ston was also an anthropologist, a dramatist in the WPA Federal Theater Project, and member of
the Federal Writer's Project. Id. Hurston's literary labors produced such notable works as Their
Eyes Were Watching God, Mules and Men, Jonah's Gourd Vine and Moses, Man of The Moun-
tain. Dust Tracks On A Road was Hurston's autobiography. As if out of a Greek tragedy, how-
ever, Hurston, who in spite of the burden of American racism, produced a rich and original body
of literary works, and who today is both celebrated and studied across the nation, died a pauper
in a Florida welfare home.
105. Id.
106. Margaret Barnes, The Introduction & Growing of Celery in Seminole County (Nov. 5,
1964) in SEMINOLE COUNTY WRITERS PROGRAM, FEDERAL WRITERS PROJECTS, AMERICAN
GUIDE 31.
107. Zora Neale Hurston in her autobiography, Dust Tracks On A Road, briefly describes
her experiences attending a "Negro School"; HURSTON supra note 105 at 34-35.
108. This anecdote was included in Zora Neale Hurston materials on display at the Univer-
sity of Florida Smathers Library Special Collections African American History Exhibit in the
spring of 2004, but its original source was not identified. It also is found on a number of websites
but none attributes the story to any original source. See e.g. www.jocelync.com/portfolio-paths.
html
109. BARNES, supra note 107 at 3-5 (Nov. 5, 1936). See also ARTHUR E. FRANKE, JR, FLC'R-
IDA SEMINOLE COUNTY HISTORICAL COMMISSION EARLY DAYS OF SEMINOLE COUNTY 32 (Uni-
16
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local writer employed by the Federal Writer's Project, in a 1936 manu-
script, observed that many African-Americans living near Sanford "all
work on the farms" and that the "laborers in and around Sanford are
transported to and from the fields in huge trucks, with slatted sides...
and wedged in literally like sardines in a can."'110 As if taken from the
pages of a John Steinbeck novel, Barnes noted that in 1936, "[f]armers
from California, during the lettuce strike, sneaked in under cover of
night and carried off two truck loads of [African-American
laborers] .111
Sanford, which sits about 20 miles east of Orlando on the 1-4 corri-
dor, long prided itself on being the celery capital of the nation.!1 2 Un-
til the mid 1970's, celery and other vegetable crops covered the fields
around Sanford but a drive through the area today finds those former
celery and vegetable fields replaced by upscale housing subdivisions
and malls. Many of the poor African-American families that labored
in the celery and vegetable fields for subsistence wages, however, still
call run-down public housing and poor racially segregated housing
home.113 To this extent, Seminole County has changed little.
Seminole County's history includes the unmistakable American
signpost of racial segregation - - including segregated schools. 114 Even
after the downfall of "separate but equal" '115 and the passage of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,116 voluntary efforts to dismantle its
racially segregated dual system came about slowly.117 In 1970, a fed-
eral civil rights suit brought by the United States Department of Jus-
tice eventually replaced those voluntary efforts with judicial oversight
through a series of consent orders.118 However, even though it has
been over three decades since the lawsuit was initially filed, judicial
intervention has yet to bring a complete end to the legacy of school
segregation in Seminole County.119 The disproportionate discipline of
versity of Florida Smathers Library, Special Collections 1984). Celery, lettuce and other
vegetables were grown on thousands of acres by large agribusiness enterprises like A. Duda and
Sons. In the nineteenth century, Sanford, Florida "was the largest orange shipping point in Flor-
ida." A severe freeze in 1894 diminished Seminole County's role in orange production. See Id.
110. BARNES Supra note 110 at 3.
111. Id. at 4.
112. FRANKE, JR., Supra at note 110, at 10.
113. Elaine Backhaus and Gary Taylor, Low-Income Families Fear Losing Homes, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 20, 1999; Rene Stuzman, Sanford's Help Would Be A Breath of Fresh Air, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 10, 2000, at D1. (recounting stories of tenants that were former agricul-
tural workers who still live in public housing).
114. See United States v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 553 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1977).
115. Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 U.S. 1138 (1896).
116. 42 U.S.C. ch. 2000(d) et seq.
117. Seminole County. Sch. Dist., 553 F.2d at 994-95.
118. Id. at 993-95.
119. Idat 995. The history of desegregation (and resistance to integration) in the Seminole
County schools is examined by Sallie Jenkins in her recent doctoral dissertation, A Historical
20041
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African-American students is part of that legacy. One of the continu-
ing areas of concern of the United States Department of Justice is the
unfair and disproportionate discipline of African American stu-
dents 120 - - which brings me back to the expulsion of S.S., my fifteen-
year-old client.
The incident giving rise to the expulsion charges against my client
occurred on a school bus taking students home for the day.121 On that
afternoon, another student, who had been involved in previous alter-
cations with S.S., verbally harassed and threatened her.122 At the
time, the other student was under a juvenile court order prohibiting
her from having any contact with my client. t23 Soon after the other
student began verbally harassing S.S., the other students on the busjoined in with yelling, jumping from seat to seat, and actively encour-
aging the altercation - - until the point at which the bus became riot-
ous.
1 24 My client was innocent, but to prove her innocence I first had
to overcome the anticipated testimony of eight student eyewitnesses,
each of whom had given a written statement.2 2 Ironically, my efforts
to prove my client's innocence were unintentionally assisted by the
institutional orthodoxy that I described earlier.
During the course of the expulsion proceeding, it was discovered
that the school's vice-principal had interviewed almost all of the stu-
dent eyewitnesses together in the same room and had them write their
witness statements while sitting together in the same room.126 It was
also disclosed during the expulsion hearing that the vice principal de-
stroyed the first set of statements given by the student eyewitnesses
and that he used threats to get some of the students to sign state-
ments. 127 The vice principal, however, explained the spoliation of the
first set of statements as justified because they were written on the
wrong form.t28 The school district, prior to the day of the expulsion
hearing, however, never disclosed that an earlier set of statements had
Investigation of School Desegregation in Seminole County School District (University Of Central
Florida, 2002) Salley Jenkins credits Seminole County with substantial efforts to desegregate in
the past six years, but nevertheless concluded "there is still much more that must be done" to
comply with Brown. See JENKINS at 183.
120. U.S. v. Seminole County Sch. Dist. 2000 Consent Decree at § VII (E) & VIII (8).
121. Seminole County Public Schools Secondary Student Discipline Referral (August 20,
1997); August 18, 1997 Incident Report By Seminole County Public School Bus Driver.
122. Transcript at 93, Hagerty v. S.S., (Case No. 97-11) Sch. Bd. of Seminole County, Fla.
(October 23, 1997).
123. Id. at 80.
124. Incident Report by Seminole County Public School Bus Driver (August 18, 1997).
125. Seminole County Public Schools Student Discipline Witness Statements in Hagerty v.
S.S.
126. Transcript at 35, Hagerty (Case No. 97-11).
127. Id. at 71, 153-155, 140 & 145-146, 149-150.
128. Id. at 154.
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ever existed or that they had been destroyed. When the spoliation of
the first set of statements was uncovered at the expulsion hearing, the
Seminole County School Board's attorney offered the following exis-
tential explanation: "They're not in existence. At the time they were
requested, [the vice principal] didn't have them, so you can't provide
what you don't have."1"9
It was also revealed at the expulsion hearing that the day before the
hearing the school district's lawyer had gone to the high school and,
with the assistance of a school security staff person, removed a student
witness from class to interview her.13° At the expulsion hearing, an-
other student disclosed she had been threatened by the vice principal
unless she gave a statement.1 31 The student explained under oath
that: "[The vice principal] said he can have me hand cuffed when I
refused to sign it.' 32 This student further corroborated the vice prin-
cipal's use of threats. She testified that the vice principal "said that he
would have [her] butt in jail [and] arrested ... "133 even though the
student had told the school official she did not see a knife.134 After
these disclosures were made, it took very little time for the Seminole
County School District to agree to a settlement that included with-
drawal and expungement of the expulsion charges against the
student.135
At the outset of the expulsion proceeding, the task of proving the
student's innocence looked both daunting and, as an evidentiary mat-
ter, almost beyond reach. What made it possible to prove her inno-
cence though, was the very institutional orthodoxy that permeated the
school's judgment and which colored virtually all of its actions - - leav-
ing almost no room for the truth to breathe except within the confines
of an adversarial proceeding that provided the full measure of due
process. Because the student had the ability to cross-examine wit-
nesses, compel the appearance of witnesses, present evidence, take
depositions, and had access to legal counsel, she was able to mount a
successful defense.
This was not the case, however, in Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole
County.1 36 In Anderson, it was the student's lack of representation at
the expulsion hearing that puts in sharp focus the importance of a
student's access to counsel. The student in Anderson, J.A., had been
129. Id. at 151.
130. Id. at 121-122.
131. Id. at 140.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 145-149.
134. Id. at 147.
135. Notice of Withdrawal & Cessation of Proceedings for Expulsion, Hagerty (Case No. 97-
11) (Nov. 10, 1997).
136. 830 So.2d 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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involved in a physical confrontation with another middle school stu-
dent. 137 Prior to the incident, however, J.A.'s parent had actually con-
tacted the school and discussed with the school's assistant principal
the difficulties J.A. had been having with the other student.138 During
the incident between the two students that led to the expulsion, a
school administrator attempted to intervene but, in trying to inter-
vene, the administrator was injured. 3 9 J.A. was placed under expul-
sion for battery on a staff person and for fighting.14 °
In Anderson, the student's right to a fair proceeding was compro-
mised at the very outset when the notice of the expulsion hearing was
delivered on the Friday before the following Monday expulsion pro-
ceeding.'41 This provided the student with less than one full business
day to prepare. Retaining counsel was not possible because J.A. was
indigent. 4 The notice did not inform J.A. of the actual charges on
which the expulsion proceeding would be based, of her right to appear
with counsel, her right to cross-examine witnesses, her right to con-
front witnesses, her right to present mitigating evidence 143 on the ap-
propriate punishment, or her right to compel the attendance of
witnesses. 44 As a practical matter, the Seminole County Public
School's approach to informing students who are under expulsion of
their due process rights could fairly be described as a "don't ask, don't
tell" policy. If a parent does not ask the school what protections are
available, the School District does not tell them.
At J.A.'s expulsion hearing, the school used hearsay evidence,
failed to produce the other student to testify, and made no mention
whatsoever of the fact that J.A.'s parent had contacted the school
about her concerns regarding the other student's conduct toward J.A.
Further, J.A. was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the two
school officials who gave statements in support of expulsion.145 Not
137. Id.; see also Transcript at 4-5, Anderson.
138. Transcript at 9, Anderson..
139. Id. at 6.
140. Seminole County Public School Preliminary Recommendation for Expulsion, Anderson
(Feb. 14, 2002).
141. Anderson, 830 So.2d at 953.
142. Following the expulsion hearing, J.A. learned of a local legal services office, which in
turn, contacted me about taking on J.A.'s appeal. I agreed and co-counseled the appeal with
Treena Kaye, the managing attorney of the local legal services office. Because of her indigency,
the student was able to prosecute her appeal in forma pauperis. See April 22, 2002 School Board
Order Granting Motion To Waive Appellate Court's Filing Fee; April 29, 2002 Fifth District
Court of Appeal Order allowing appeal to proceed without payment of fees.
143. The Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez, 95 U.S. 729, 741 (1975) also recognized that even
when a student is culpable, due process also requires providing the student an opportunity "to
characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context." This requirement goes
to the nature and severity of the sanction rather than to guilt or innocence.
144. Seminole County Public School Notice of February 25 2002 Expulsion Hearing
145. Transcript at 7, Anderson..
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surprisingly, not a single objection was made at the hearing. 146 Conse-
quently, J.A. failed to preserve any claim of error and the expulsion
was affirmed on appeal.' 47
V. LESSONS LEARNED
The most salient lesson of Hagarty v. S.S. is the vital importance of
a student's access to legal counsel. Ironically, this was also the lesson
drawn from Anderson. The appellate court that reviewed the expul-
sion in Anderson was unmoved by J.A.'s pro se status at the hearing or
by her claims of fundamental error that were raised for the first time
on appeal. While the appellate court's decision in Anderson draws
ample support from Florida judicial precedent, which has largely re-
fused to give pro se litigants any favored treatment in the review of
unpreserved error on appeal, the ruling in Anderson, however, was
not compelled by precedent.148 The IDEA governs the rights of dis-
abled students. Federal courts have recognized that not only do
"schools have an affirmative obligation to inform parents of their pro-
cedural rights under the IDEA," [but] also "where a parent is unrep-
resented and does not have notice of his or her rights . . . failure to
raise a procedural violation at the due process hearing may not bar
judicial consideration of that violation."' 49
The Anderson decision, though, can perhaps be better understood if
the outcome is seen more as the result of the general discomfort
courts have with intervening in the school disciplinary process' 50 than
as judicial approval of a school district's abridgment of a student's due
process rights. Anderson, however, teaches us an old lesson: Consti-
tutionally inadequate notice combined with lack of counsel will almost
always deny a public school student facing expulsion the process she is
due. Over seven decades ago in the notorious Scottsboro case, Powell
v. Alabama, 5 ' the United States Supreme Court explained:
146. Id. at 4-23.
147. Anderson, 830 So.2d at 953.
148. See e.g. Wood v. State, 544 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 1989) (court held that adequate notice
and meaningful hearing prior to termination of substantive rights or other state enforced penalty
is central to due process and denial of these basic constitutional rights constitutes fundamental
error); Crepage v. City of Lauderhill, 774 So.2d 61 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (twenty-four
hour notice was not adequate notice in statutory forfeiture case).
149. Briere By & Through Brown v. Fair Haven Grade Sch. Dist., 948 F. Supp. 1242, 1253
(D. Vt. 1996); See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.504 (mandating that parents of disabled children under
the IDEA must be given written notice of a range of procedural safeguards).
150. See e.g. Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 149 F. Supp. 2d 665, 675 (E.D. Wisc.
2001).
151. 53 U.S. 55 (1932).
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It never has been doubted by this court, or any other so far as we
know, that notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the
passing of an enforceable judgment...
[T]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of the law.15
2
The most effective way to insure students are given the full measure
of due process is to provide students who cannot afford private coun-
sel with appointed representation in expulsion proceedings. No
doubt, this proposal will be considered by many as heresy, t 53 but ab-
sent appointed counsel, the right to counsel in expulsion hearings, as
well as the right to a fair hearing, is illusory. This concern is put in
even sharper relief by the draconian use of zero tolerance policies and
the continuing legacy of racial discrimination reflected in the dispro-
portionate discipline of African-American students. The United
States Supreme Court in Brown explicitly affirmed that public educa-
tion is a cornerstone of our participatory democracy. Almost two de-
cades later, Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing in dissent in San
Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 54 eloquently remarked
that "no other state function is so uniformly recognized as an essential
element of our society's well-being."' 55 If this remains true today,
then poor children 156 who face complete exclusion from our public
schools should be given a constitutionally meaningful opportunity to
protect their earliest participation in our democracy.
152. Id.
153. In acknowledging this, I readily concede there is little judicial precedent to support this
position. An examination of this issue, however, is deserving of separate treatment and will be
left to others to consider. The point, however, is not what the law currently requires, but what it
should require. Over the course of American history in general, and American legal history in
particular, schisms between what the law (judge-made or legislative) required and protected and
what it should require and protect have frequently been slow to close, sometimes taking even
centuries to occur.
154. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
155. Id. at 112.
156. See note 14.
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